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Richard Vedder, Distinguished Professor of Economics at Ohio University, has been described as the most “out-spoken (and most entertaining) member” of that fractious 
body, the U.S. Secretary of Education’s Commission on the 
Future of Higher Education (Lederman, 2006, ¶13). Two years 
before the Commission’s fi nal report in September 2006, Ved-
der published his own book-length critique of American higher 
education: Going Broke by Degree: Why College Costs Too Much 
(Vedder, 2004). 
Vedder’s book has much to say about fi nancial aid and 
college pricing. While making numerous proposals for control-
ling the cost escalation that seems to turn so much of fi nancial 
aid into a desperate effort to keep up, he claims that fi nancial 
aid itself helps cause the escalation. It should be noted that the 
national body to which he was appointed—the Commission on 
the Future of Higher Education--was much concerned with qual-
ity and accountability in higher education as well as access and 
student aid. Turning the tables and holding this  commissioner 
accountable for the quality of his own quality of work, we can 
ask ourselves, did he write a good book? 
The short answer is no. Going Broke by Degree is laden 
with contradiction, gaps in the exposition, relevant research 
ignored, error, and a style that moves between a general, breezy 
readability and sudden, unexplained jargon. 
And yet Vedder’s book has value. Deploying an ingenious 
array of studies, it challenges the conventional wisdom that 
more public investment in higher education will necessarily 
benefi t the economy. And several of his specifi c proposals for 
containing college costs and prices—especially his ideas about 
reducing program duplication between campuses—deserve seri-
ous thought.  
The nub of Vedder’s thesis is this: shielded from market 
discipline by government and private subsidies, colleges do not 
spend their money as effi ciently as business fi rms. Instead, 
they have been allowed to develop bad and lax practices. They 
have cut faculty teaching loads while “cross-subsidizing” re-
search—too much of it trivial—with funds from undergraduate 
tuition. Campus administrators and professional support staff 
have multiplied far more than faculty, but the privilege of fac-
ulty tenure balkanizes the university into fi efdoms that resist 
the effi cient reallocation of resources. While politically correct 
conformity fl ourishes, students are mollycoddled with luxurious 
facilities and slack academic demands. 
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As a result of all this, a state whose public spending on 
higher education grows more as a proportion of personal income 
per capita than a similar, neighboring state is likely to see less 
economic growth—less increase in per capita income—than its 
neighbor. Despite the employment and quality of life produced 
by academic communities, state spending on other sectors is 
more economically productive.
If higher education does not shape up, Vedder warns, 
other sources of further education and research, including for-
profi t colleges and high-tech business, will make serious inroads 
into the markets of public and nonprofi t private colleges, depriv-
ing them of tuition revenue and research grants. 
In the absence of radical shifts in higher-education fund-
ing, Vedder would have the states direct their subsidies more 
selectively to reward reductions in bureaucracy and promote 
cost containment. Ideally, though, Vedder would switch virtually 
all state subsidies into tuition vouchers for students, scaled ac-
cording to their incomes. Armed with these vouchers and exist-
ing federal and other aid, students would vote with their feet, 
exerting consumer pressure on state colleges to deliver better 
service at lower cost.
The case for vouchers, in various shapes and forms, is 
not new, but Vedder does not argue it well. For one thing, it is 
not clear how his scheme would treat private nonprofi t colleges, 
since the state appropriations to be replaced by the vouchers 
would go almost entirely to state institutions. Initially, it seems, 
the vouchers would be usable only at state and community col-
leges, although Vedder does not say this explicitly. Ideally, Vedder 
declares he would like to privatize the public colleges and end 
direct subsidies of colleges by public and private donors in favor 
of student vouchers. But would he really want to eliminate all 
private donations and legacies to colleges? And how would he 
achieve this awesome feat?  
Still more confusingly, having criticized private as well as 
public subsidies for reducing consumer “price sensitivity” and 
thus encouraging price rises, Vedder accepts the role of private 
philanthropy in saving something precious but vulnerable like 
a classics department. 
Vedder’s diffi culties with vouchers refl ect his general 
muddle about fi nancial aid. He says repeatedly that all student 
aid from outside the colleges, including federal loans and tax 
credits, drives up college prices on the general economic principle 
that subsidized demand causes price rises. Why then would 
not vouchers do the same? If there is a difference, Vedder does 
not explain it. Nor does he mention the studies prompted by 
Education Secretary William Bennett’s charge in the 1980s that 
expanded federal aid, increasing student purchasing power, was 
captured by colleges in the form of higher prices. The studies, 
on balance, have largely discredited Bennett’s claim (Wilkinson, 
2005, pp 57-58; Long, 2006, pp 3-5).
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Vedder’s treatment of the huge growth in student loans 
is also inadequate. He presents student loans as an easy ride, 
with “below-market interest rates” and “generous pay-back pro-
visions,” noting that some are “even forgiven.” His comments do 
not consider that the prospect and burden of debt can dampen 
demand for college by deterring students from applying, espe-
cially those in low-income families. On the contrary, he briskly 
avers that many students in their late teens do not understand 
or worry about “meeting debt obligations” (Vedder, 2004, pp. 
20-21).
In discussing grant aid awarded by colleges themselves, 
Vedder focuses mainly on private, nonprofi t colleges. Scholar-
ships, he aptly notes, are a form of price discount. Using inti-
mate customer information provided by student statements of 
fi nancial need, colleges can fi ne-tune their price offers to different 
individuals, whereas even the airlines (whose multitude of fares 
is often likened to college pricing) can only “price discriminate” 
between broad categories of customers. 
In both colleges and airlines, varying the price can in-
crease revenue. Vedder recognizes what college presidents have 
known from at least the early nineteenth century: if you have 
unfi lled capacity, need-based scholarships can operate like any 
commercial discount, increasing enrollment (sales) and revenue. 
It is better to get that extra student who is paying something—
even if it is only room and board—than to have no student.
To have this effect, the scholarships do not actually have 
to be need-based, but Vedder does not observe this. Instead his 
discussion of non-need-based merit scholarships is concentrated 
on colleges with differing but high academic selectivity, as if 
unselective colleges do not give merit-based awards. 
Unfortunately for Vedder’s exposition, he depicts a situa-
tion in which Columbia University and Northwestern University 
decide to whom they should give big merit scholarships on the 
basis of students’ academic records. Anyone who studies fi nan-
cial aid is aware that Columbia does not give merit-based aid. 
The Ivy League universities, including Columbia and some other 
institutions with very high selectivity and strong traditions of 
need-based aid, eschew buying talent with merit scholarships 
and can afford their principles. Northwestern, for its part, has 
resisted giving academic merit awards despite strong competi-
tion from peers who give them. It does now fund some  limited 
National Merit awards and some merit awards in music. (Vedder 
should have known this: he is a Northwestern alumnus.)
As Vedder observes, the many colleges that do give merit-
based awards tend to award them to students who will raise the 
student body’s quality, as measured by SAT/ACT scores and 
high-school class rank, and so, hopefully, improve the college’s 
ratings in U.S. News & World Report and other infl uential ranking 
sources. The same often applies to the “preferential packaging” 
of need-based aid (more grant, less loan or work-study) for more 
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There is an important difference here between higher 
education and most commercial business. Some of a college’s 
student customers are also suppliers, providing quality, diversity, 
and other characteristics that the college prizes. These charac-
teristics may have market value in that they attract other stu-
dents (customers), but they will also fi t the college’s educational 
purposes: good students and diverse students contribute to the 
campus environment. Vedder says little about the educational 
and social purposes of fi nancial aid given by colleges. This may 
explain why he overlooks the unique customer/supplier feature 
of colleges, though the chapter in which he discusses college 
admissions and fi nancial aid—titled “The New Peculiar Insti-
tution”—focuses on what is unusual about higher education 
compared with commercial business.
Despite his free-market preferences, Vedder does not 
always approve when colleges act like market operators by try-
ing to increase their revenue as much as possible with various 
spending purposes. He rightly perceives that scholarships enable 
colleges to raise the full tuition charged to their wealthier stu-
dents by providing fi nancial aid discounts to those who cannot 
pay the full price. Vedder implies that this is price gouging. He 
also does not note that merit scholarships go disproportionately 
to richer students.
On the subject of admissions and alumni, Vedder gives 
short shrift to the market economics he usually espouses. Using 
Daniel Golden’s Wall Street Journal exposes, he cites vivid, and 
indeed shocking, examples of admissions preferences for alumni 
and other families likely to give big money to the college. As he 
and others have observed, this belies the “concept of meritoc-
racy” to which modern American higher education subscribes 
(Vedder, 2004, p. 75; Golden, April 2003, p. A1; Golden, Oct. 
2003, p. B1).
As an economist, however, Vedder should recognize that 
colleges—especially nonprofi t private ones—have two markets: 
a customer market and a donor market, in somewhat the same 
way that business corporations have investor markets as well as 
customer markets. In the donor market, colleges compete with 
other charitable enterprises for money that enhances programs 
and, in their case, funds scholarships, which is a favorite ob-
ject of college donors. Admissions tips to alumni “legacies” and 
“development admits” (children of likely big donors) are part of 
the process. Vedder may not like it, but he should recognize 
the tension between market and meritocracy. I suspect he does 
not see it like this because he views college donations not as a 
market matter but as “third-party” subsidies, i.e., external to 
what colleges get paid by their student customers. In fact they 
are both.
In the case of expanding college bureaucracy, Vedder 
again neglects a market factor. He gives compelling fi gures 
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“professionals” per hundred students (full-time equivalents) 
nearly doubled between 1976-77 and 1999-2000 whereas 
faculty grew by nine per cent. He has no real explanation for 
this except to guess that much of it went on research support. 
Robert Zemsky, another higher education commissioner, and 
two co-authors give a better picture of this in their book, Re-
making the University: Market-Smart, Mission-Centered (Zemsky, 
Wegner, and Massy, 2005). They attribute the growth of college 
administrators to offi ce empire-building, encouraged in turn by 
faculty abandonment of student advising to support staff and 
by student demand for more services. 
In other words, the growth of administration decried by 
Vedder is in part a response to the very market forces (customer 
demand) that he venerates. Likewise, the new dorms and fancy 
student centers, which Vedder sees as wasteful luxuries, are 
part of what colleges do to compete for business. Vedder also 
neglects the market in proposing an increase in full-time faculty 
teaching loads. The proposal has merit (dare I say it) but does 
not address the fact that many colleges compete for good faculty 
via teaching and research conditions, not just remuneration. 
When Vedder does apply market principles, the result 
can be unfair and possibly self-defeating. His handling of ca-
reer-long faculty tenure is a case in point. Vedder admits he is 
“highly ambivalent” about the tenure system. While agreeing that 
it protects “free speech and expression,” he also believes that 
it enables entrenched professors to “block new initiatives and 
to maintain costly, outmoded programs” (Vedder, 2004, p. 217) 
His solution: make tenure an optional benefi t that a qualifying 
professor can buy. Vedder says nothing about the regressiveness 
of this solution, which would clearly favor wealthier faculty who 
are most able to buy tenure. And it would still enable key faculty 
to entrench themselves and their courses. 
Perhaps the strongest chapter of the book is the one 
that takes us through state-based studies of higher education’s 
economic payoffs, both for graduates and for society (what econo-
mists call “externalities”), and the relationship between state 
investment in higher education and economic growth, already 
summarized above (Vedder, 2004, chapter 7). Vedder does not 
deny the payoffs of higher education, but he issues salutary 
warnings. He observes that some of the increasing income differ-
ence between graduates and non-graduates may be due to what 
others have called a “sheepskin” effect or “credentialism”—the 
initial career advantages of being able to show employers a col-
lege degree rather than the education itself. It may also be that 
college graduates earn more because of the kind of people who go 
to college and graduate; social scientists in the fi eld call this  the 
“alpha” effect. Unfortunately, Vedder does not mention studies 
that have tried to explore the extent and limits of these factors 
(e.g., Park, 1993; Leslie and Brinkman, 1994). 
On the general relationship between higher education and 
economic growth, Vedder notes that some of the relationship may 
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be a reverse one. He speculates that college-educated people 
tend to move to areas with high economic growth. He might 
also have observed that richer communities tend to want more 
higher education. 
Like Alison Wolf, the British educationist and labor 
economist, Vedder warns that just because higher education 
has appeared so far to assist economic growth in both our coun-
tries does not mean that putting more and more people through 
college will go on growing the economy (Wolf, 2002). There is a 
limit, even in a “knowledge economy,” to how many graduates 
the economy needs. Vedder argues indeed that the relationship 
between a state’s economic growth and the graduate proportion 
of its adults is weakening. For those of us who want to equalize 
educational opportunity, there is a lesson here. It has always 
been tempting to try to justify principles of social fairness by 
hard-headed economics and to claim, in this case, that extending 
higher education to more and more people will benefi t the whole 
economy. The principle of social fairness, however, should stand 
on its own feet. Whatever proportion of adults goes to college, 
equalizing the opportunity to get there and the fi nancial burdens 
thereof should make its own appeal to democratic justice.
Vedder is not much into this. Although he supports 
need-based aid, his reform agenda does not include provision for 
helping disadvantaged students with college potential to realize 
that potential—and he is no friend of affi rmative action. Still, 
his book makes one think about these issues. More generally, 
too, for all its fl aws, perhaps indeed because of them, Going 
Broke by Degree provokes thought about the peculiar nature of 
modern American higher education and its mixture of mission, 
self-interest, and market infl uences. 
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